This change updates the collateral requirements for three collateral assets: ZRX, BAT, and WBTC

As mentioned on the [forums](https://www.comp.xyz/t/zrx-bat-and-wbtc-parameter-update/1244), WBTC collateral poses a threat to the financial health of the Compound protocol. Currently, WBTC risk is 8 times worse than it was 2 weeks ago and now accounts for 99% of the risk in the protocol across all assets. We are moving to lower the collateral factor for WBTC from 75% to 65%. This will reduce (but not remove) the aforementioned risk, and we will re-evaluate if the proposal passes before proposing to lower it further to 0.6%. If liquidity and volatility for WBTC improve, we will be sure to take that into account. 

We are also changing the collateral factors for both ZRX and BAT, raising those slightly to improve capital efficiency for borrowers. We realize that bundling these changes might make the decision more complex for voters. However, these additional changes are small and were largely unopposed in [the last proposal](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/38) that merely failed to reach quorum amidst high gas prices.

ZRX, BAT, and WBTC Parameter Update

## Summary 

We’re excited to propose changes to the Compound protocol that will improve capital efficiency for borrowers. We’ve run extensive stress tests of the protocol, the results of which we have shared [here](https://www.comp.xyz/t/risk-parameter-update-february-2021/1144). These results identify BAT and ZRX as two of the lowest risk collateral assets, and we are increasing the collateralFactor for these two assets to allow users to better take advantage of these markets.

Adjust BAT, ZRX collateral factors

This proposal acts to establish a policy for returning accidentally sent funds accessible by Governance under the following terms. 

- Sender must verify their identity through a signature or on-chain calldata and request return of funds on the compound forums within 6 months of accidental transfer
- Funds will only be returned to the originating address
- A 10% penalty will be imposed
- The sent funds must have a minimum value of $1,000 at the time of the post
- At most, once every six months, a proposal will be made that returns all funds eligible under these terms

Currently, there is one eligible transaction, and this proposal acts to return the locked funds under the terms stated above. In order to do so, we must set a new implementation for cUNI which adds the `sweepToken` functionality. It additionally removes unused verify callbacks resulting in minor gas savings on most interactions. This code change was developed in the open and reviewed by community members. Full testing has been done including unit tests and forking simulations. Due to the limited scope of the changes, they have not been professionally audited.

The last call grants Arr00 30 COMP for organizing this process and completing the necessary code changes.

[Discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/implement-ctoken-sweeptoken-and-return-accidentally-sent-funds)
[New cUNI Implementation](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa1849880593E96d2f7dF77D0D38a7f2372aE10E0#code)
[GitHub PR](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-protocol/pull/97)
[Accidental transfer](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3d4d8248b1f80d436f1afddcbe6a1380b7417dfb602ca7e6cf5cb0d546a3afed)

Return Accidentally Sent Funds

This change increases the Collateral Factor of WBTC from 60% to 75%. 

On October 1st, Proposal 24 was passed to raise WBTC’s Collateral Factor from 40% to 60%. According to Defi Pulse, on October 1st, there were ~$1B of WBTC in circulation. Today there are $4.38B of WBTC in circulation. In addition to having a much larger supply today, WBTC liquidity has significantly grown since Proposal 24 was passed.

Uniswap: $150M
Sushiswap: $256M
Balancer: $200M
1inch: $160M

In addition to growing liquidity on decentralized exchanges, centralized exchanges are continuing to adopt WBTC. Shortly after Proposal 24 passed, Coinbase added WBTC markets. As well, Binance continues to be a growing hub for WBTC/BTC trading. 

With the significant increase in WBTC circulation, liquidity, and infrastructure, it is safe for Compound to increase Collateral Factor to 75%. From a growth/business standpoint, AAVE currently has its Collateral Factor set to 75%. Compound Finance needs to remain competitive to avoid losing market share.

Set WBTC Collateral Factor to 75%

## Summary

As [Robert Leshner mentioned in his forum post]([https://compound.finance/governance](https://compound.finance/governance)), the community now has the power to control COMP distribution across markets after [Gauntlet's recent proposal (#33)](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/33). This will allow the protocol to better and more efficiently manage how COMP is used to improve and further the protocol's interests. Given that the initial COMP distribution numbers were set somewhat arbitrarily, it has become clear that it is worth resetting the parameters based on usage over the last six months. The refreshed numbers proposed will be used for A/B testing optimal COMP emission quantities in future proposals.

In a [comp.xyz forum post]([https://www.comp.xyz/t/comp-distribution-speeds/899/11](https://www.comp.xyz/t/comp-distribution-speeds/899/11)), Robert and Sirokko have put forth reasonable suggestions that we believe would improve upon the existing values. Both of their values for COMP distribution were quite similar and we chose Sirokko's numbers for two reasons:
1. All markets are given a fixed quantity (10% of rewards spread evenly across the 9 active markets) of COMP rewards
2. Splitting each market's COMP rewards into a fixed quantity (common to all markets) and a variable quantity makes it easy to analyze improvements in future A/B tests for incentives

Please read the forum post for more details.

## Acknowledgments
- Robert Leshner: For starting the discussion and putting out the first distribution numbers
- Sirokko: For providing a coherent methodology for this refresh
- Hsien-Tang Kao: For analyzing 1-step recursive borrowing in existing markets

## References
- [Forum post](https://www.comp.xyz/t/comp-distribution-speeds/899/21)

COMP Speed Recalibration

When the DSR (Dai Savings Rate) was introduced by MakerDAO, the Compound team developed a [CDaiDelegate](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-protocol/blob/master/contracts/CDaiDelegate.sol) to take advantage of DSR (pre governance). With DSR remaining at 0% for an extended period of time, it would be advantageous for the sake of gas fees to change back to an implementation which doesn’t deposit to DSR.

I propose setting the cDai implementation to the [CErc20Delegate](https://etherscan.io/address/0x976aa93ca5aaa569109f4267589c619a097f001d#code) which is already the implementation for cUSDT and setting the interest rate model for cDai to [that of cUSDT](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFB564da37B41b2F6B6EDcc3e56FbF523bD9F2012#code). The interest rate model change is necessary because the current IRM takes DSR into account. The actual interest parameters (base rate, multiplier, jump multiplier, and kink) will remain the same.

The end result of this proposal will be gas savings for users. This proposal has been simulated on a network fork to ensure expected outcome and uses contracts which have already been part of the Compound ecosystem for a long time. For more information, please see [this post](https://www.comp.xyz/t/migrate-cdai-implementation-from-cdaidelegate-to-cerc20delegate/807) on the Compound forums.

Semi-Permanent Gas Saving Measures for the DAI Market

## Summary
In order to reduce the size of the `Comptroller` for both vesting updates and future changes, this proposal contains a number of size and gas optimizations. Currently, there is not enough space in the `Comptroller` for vesting changes, which is the main impetus for this proposal. We split this out from the remainder of the vesting changes, as these changes provide protocol users with some more immediate gas benefits. An itemized summary of the changes is as follows:
1. This proposal removes automatic COMP claims for users and also removes automatic COMP speed refresh, replacing it with `_setCompSpeed` , controlled by governance
2. Implements several related small changes related to the above to further optimize the Comptroller contract and reduce gas costs for users.
Please note that this patch is **not** in itself making any immediate COMP speed adjustment, it is simply removing some redundant speed change functions and giving governance more direct control.

## References
- [Audit, by QuantStamp](https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/compound-protocol) (please note that some of the code has changed since the audit, see PR for more details) 
- [Pull Request on GitHub](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-protocol/pull/83)
- [Forum post](https://www.comp.xyz/t/comptroller-optimizations-to-enable-vesting/845)

Remove automatic COMP claims and COMP speed refresh

**Background:**

COMP distribution to users began on June 15, 2020, and has since distributed ~450K COMP, with approximately 4MM COMP remaining.

Behind the scenes, the distribution works through two main contracts, the [Reservoir](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2775b1c75658be0f640272ccb8c72ac986009e38), and the [Comptroller](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3d9819210a31b4961b30ef54be2aed79b9c9cd3b). The `Reservoir` is an immutable contract that exists outside the control of governance and drips 0.50 COMP per block into the `Comptroller` contract. The Reservoir continuously adds COMP at the drip rate and is independent of the rate at which the Comptroller distributes such COMP. The Comptroller contract controls the usage and distribution rate of COMP for a number of functions including but not limited to, i) distribution to borrowers and lenders for each market, ii) [building a reserve](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/21) that can be used for community needs, and iii) voting, among other uses.

Currently, the Comptroller distributes 0.352 COMP/block (70%) on liquidity incentives and accrues the remaining 0.148 COMP/block (30%) as treasury reserves. At the current COMP price of $155, Compound's treasury is growing at a rate of ~$149,000 per day, or $4.5MM per month.

[Gauntlet's prop30](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/30) added the [ability](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-contributor-grants/756) for the Comptroller contract to send COMP to a particular user, group, address, or contract selected by a governance vote. These changes as [described by jmo](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-contributor-grants/756), enable a plethora of use cases, including the use of treasury assets to compensate those liquidated in the Thanksgiving Event, as [suggested by mrhen](https://www.comp.xyz/t/dai-liquidation-compensation/684/10).

**Mechanics:**

This proposal uses the `_grantComp` function introduced by Gauntlet to distribute a set quantity of COMP to a [Merkle distributor contract](https://github.com/kybx86/compound/blob/master/compensation_prop/merkle-root/compCompensationMerkleTree.json) that will automatically distribute the corresponding COMP to each of the [wallets](https://github.com/kybx86/compound/blob/master/compensation_prop/generateAddressBalances/addressBalancesDecimal.json) affected—user's don't need to interact with any contract to claim this COMP; After the proposal's execution, the relayer will claim COMP for each wallet according to the Merkle distributor and distribute it.

To calculate the amount of COMP needed from the Comptroller for the compensation, this proposal uses the 14-day average closing price of COMP from [CoinMarketCap](https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/compound/historical-data/) as of the time of writing (12/8/20) to compensate users 8% of the liquidated amount.

As an illustrative example, if a wallet had 100 DAI repaid by a liquidator, then that wallet would receive 8 DAI worth of COMP, which equates to 0.064 COMP of compensation (using a 14-day average COMP price of $123.39).

**Distributor Methodology**

Referencing the DAI liquidations [spreadsheet](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ozVGA7mwn-xFQb1oAKsNczMRL-Dj9JgG_0UXH2IQ1s8/edit#gid=0) published by [rleshner](https://twitter.com/rleshner), a total of 85,220,406.43 DAI was repaid on 11/26/20. Applying the 8% liquidation penalty, this proposal would pay out a total of 6,817,632.51 DAI (in COMP). Taking the 6,817,632.51 DAI and dividing by $123.39 (the 14-day average price of COMP) equals 55,254.95 COMP distributed to users.

- To view the detailed math breakdown, [see here](https://aws1.discourse-cdn.com/standard17/uploads/compoundcommunity/original/1X/6385f4950b0adcf89edc3178f7248c181908fb71.png).
- To preview the COMP distribution per address, [see here](https://github.com/kybx86/compound/blob/master/compensation_prop/generateAddressBalances/addressBalancesDecimal.json).

Overall, this distribution of COMP represents only 0.55% of the fully diluted COMP 10M supply and less than 2% of the 24hr COMP volume traded globally, suggesting minimal market impact. Additionally, assuming the Comptroller earns 962 COMP per day, the 55k COMP distribution will be replenished in less than 60 days.

**Next steps:**
If you support this proposal, you can delegate COMP to this autonomous proposal.

**Disclosure:**
For full transparency, I was one of the 121 Compound users affected in the DAI liquidation event. I recently worked with the community to pass a [reserve factor change](https://www.comp.xyz/t/increase-dai-reserve-factor-from-5-to-15/765/3) to the DAI market to de-risk it and prevent repeat events.

**Resources:**
To view the full forum post, [see here](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compensation-proposal/801).

Distribute COMP to Affected Users in the DAI Liquidations

[Reserve Factor](https://compound.finance/docs/ctokens#reserve-factor) was changed several times to mitigate market risks; it is time to adjust them to the current market.

### What is Reserve Factor?
The [Reserve Factor](https://compound.finance/docs/ctokens#reserve-factor) is a percentage of the borrowers paid interest which can be used by the governance or act as an insurance against borrower default which protects all the suppliers.

Increased [Reserve Factor](https://compound.finance/docs/ctokens#reserve-factor)
+ USDC 5% to 7.5%
+ DAI 5% to 15%
+ ETH 10% to 20%
+ WBTC 10% to 20%
+ UNI 20% to 25%
+ COMP 20% to 25%

Decreased [Reserve Factor](https://compound.finance/docs/ctokens#reserve-factor)
+ USDT 20% to 7.5%
+ BAT 50% to 25%
+ ZRX 50% to 25%


This proposal includes a community member [Autonomous Proposal](https://compound.finance/governance/address/0x5576a4db81a44cb7158fc8d5ae752cb44f57be76) that explains the DAI market risk.

Reference Links

[Reserve Factor Standardization](https://www.comp.xyz/t/reserve-factor-standardization/608)

[Dai Market Risk](https://www.comp.xyz/t/dai-market-risk/688)

[Increase DAI Reserve Factor from 5% to 15%](https://www.comp.xyz/t/increase-dai-reserve-factor-from-5-to-15/765)

Adjusting Reserve Factors

## Summary

The [Compound Comptroller contract](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3d9819210a31b4961b30ef54be2aed79b9c9cd3b) has a reserve of of over 100,000 COMP and growing. This proposal adds the ability for the Compound protocol to send this COMP to a particular user or group, selected by a governance vote. The functionality has two components:
1. `_grantComp`: An ability for Governance to pay a particular amount of COMP to a specific address
2. `_setContributorCompSpeed`: An ability for Goverance to _stream_ a grant to a participant.
An in-depth description of the changes can be found in [this forum post](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-contributor-grants/756) and the linked documents. We're looking forward to continuing the conversation on the forums.
Besides adding this functionality, we also:
1. Remove code from the Comptroller to reduce its size (making room for the changes mentioned above)
2. Award ourselves a COMP grant (1000 COMP) to offset development and audit costs.

## References
* [comp.xyz Forum post](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-contributor-grants/756)
* [Audit, by Quantstamp](https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/compound-protocol)
* [Development Specification](https://www.notion.so/PUBLIC-Compound-vesting-specification-b52d1c6b3bc24f53b693ebe88d0c836f)
* [Pull request on Github](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-protocol/pull/79)

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