## Simple Summary

A proposal to adjust seven (7) parameters for seven (7) Compound assets.

## Background
This proposal is a batch update of risk parameters to align with the [Moderate risk level](https://www.comp.xyz/t/community-risk-level-consensus-check/2437) chosen by the Compound community. These parameter updates are the eleventh of Gauntlet's regular parameter recommendations as part of [Dynamic Risk Parameters](https://www.comp.xyz/t/dynamic-risk-parameters/2223/16).


[Full proposal and forum discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/risk-parameter-updates-2022-05-04/3215)


## Motivation and Specification

This set of parameter updates seeks to maintain the overall risk tolerance of the protocol while making risk trade-offs between specific assets.

Our parameter recommendations are driven by an optimization function that balances 3 core metrics: insolvencies, liquidations, and borrow usage. Our parameter recommendations seek to optimize for this objective function. For more details, please see [Gauntlet's Parameter Recommendation Methodology](https://medium.com/gauntlet-networks/gauntlets-parameter-recommendation-methodology-8591478a0c1c) and [Gauntlet's Model Methodology](https://medium.com/gauntlet-networks/gauntlets-model-methodology-ea150ff0bafd).



![](https://i.imgur.com/cDlaS0K.png)







## Dashboard


Gauntlet has launched the [Compound Risk Dashboard](https://gov.gauntlet.network/compound). The community should use the Dashboard to understand better the updated parameter suggestions and general market risk in Compound.


Value at Risk represents the 95th percentile **insolvency value** that occurs from simulations we run over a range of volatilities to approximate a tail event. 

Liquidations at Risk represents the 95th percentile **liquidation volume** that occurs from simulations we run over a range of volatilities to approximate a tail event.

These parameter changes increase borrow usage by 31 basis points and have relatively minimal increases in Value at Risk and Liquidations at Risk.

Note that we are proposing increasing collateral factors for the stablecoins USDC and DAI. Recursive borrowing has decreased in the past month for both assets. The partially recursive positions have a substantial amount of other collateral assets locked, thus leading to a low chance of insolvency in those positions, as our simulation results reflect.


![](https://i.imgur.com/XafmTvt.png)

Risk Parameter Updates for 7 Collateral Assets

Aztec (https://aztec.network/) is building the programmable privacy layer for web3. In March 2021, Aztec launched the world’s first private rollup on mainnet that enabled private payments using the state of the art zkSNARK proving system, PLONK. To date, users have deposited over 30,000 ETH via zk.money, an application built on top of the Aztec network.

The network’s latest development is Aztec Connect, which enables users to interact cheaply and privately with any Ethereum DeFi application via a bridge contract that indicates how the rollup should interact with the application’s smart contract. With Aztec Connect, users can deposit into and borrow from Compound with significant gas savings and privacy by default.

This quarter, the integration will go live on zk.money. Aztec is requesting a $100,000 grant to subsidize deposits into Compound - with $50,000 distributed upfront and $50,000 released three months after launch. This subsidy will kickstart the network effects for this integration and enable significant gas savings while network throughput ramps up. 

The proposal was discussed on the Compound Governance Forum and received support from the community. More detail about the grant request is available here: https://www.comp.xyz/t/enable-cheap-private-transactions-with-compound-using-aztec/2997

Note: The COMP requested in based on the COMP price at time of proposal submission.

Grant request for launching Compound with Aztec Connect

## Summary
This proposal is a patch developed by Equilibria which updates the cToken implementation contract for high TVL assets. The new implementation has been deployed to [0x3363BAe2Fc44dA742Df13CD3ee94b6bB868ea376](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3363bae2fc44da742df13cd3ee94b6bb868ea376).

This is the final proposal to bring all upgradeable cTokens up to the new implementation. In addition to updating the implementation, it grants $350,000[1] worth of COMP to Equilibria for the upgrade work and 79,764.36 USDC to Compound Labs for the ChainSecrity audit of the protocol[2].

[1] COMP value based on the current spot price at time of this proposal ($114)
[2] ChainSecurity Payment Transaction can be viewed [here](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x8aa026292f1bc869a1353b66d47673dbcf23cab2980e0d293fa3c7474caf17d0)

## Changelog
These changes implement the following:

* Upgrade the Solidity version of the cToken and related contracts to 0.8.10 - all contracts in the repo were changed to 0.8.10 but only the cTokens will be upgraded as part of upcoming governance proposals. This is due to the complexity of having multiple Solidity versions in the same repo.
* Remove the usage of SafeMath and CarefulMath in favor of Solidity 0.8’s checked math - Solidity will now automatically revert when math errors occur (overflows, division by zero, etc)
* Remove the custom errorCode return values in favor of reverts and custom errors - this allows for a more structured way to deal with errors rather than enum or string comparisons.

The previous upgrade can be seen here: [Proposal 101](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/101)

## Development
The code changes can be viewed here: [Pull Request #152](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-protocol/pull/152).

Audits of these changes were completed by ChainSecurity and OpenZeppelin and all issues were either fixed or out of scope for this change. For further discussion, please view the [Community Forum thread](https://www.comp.xyz/t/rfp12-implementation-ctoken-cleanup/2694).

Update High-TVL cToken Implementations

## Simple Summary

A proposal to adjust two (2) parameters for two (2) Compound assets.

## Background
This proposal is a batch update of risk parameters to align with the [Moderate risk level](https://www.comp.xyz/t/community-risk-level-consensus-check/2437) chosen by the Compound community. These parameter updates are the tenth of Gauntlet's regular parameter recommendations as part of [Dynamic Risk Parameters](https://www.comp.xyz/t/dynamic-risk-parameters/2223/16).


[Full proposal and forum discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/risk-parameter-updates-2022-04-20/3183)


## Motivation and Specification

This set of parameter updates seeks to maintain the overall risk tolerance of the protocol while making risk trade-offs between specific assets.

Our parameter recommendations are driven by an optimization function that balances 3 core metrics: insolvencies, liquidations, and borrow usage. Our parameter recommendations seek to optimize for this objective function. For more details, please see [Gauntlet's Parameter Recommendation Methodology](https://medium.com/gauntlet-networks/gauntlets-parameter-recommendation-methodology-8591478a0c1c) and [Gauntlet's Model Methodology](https://medium.com/gauntlet-networks/gauntlets-model-methodology-ea150ff0bafd).


![](https://i.imgur.com/pOIFSQd.png)

Risk Parameter Updates for MKR and AAVE

## Background

**There were [timing issues](https://www.comp.xyz/t/proposal-openzeppelin-security-partnership-2022-q2-adjustment/3100/3?u=cylon) with the Sablier stream creation in past canceled proposals. In this proposal, we've removed Sablier and will continue with the existing streaming function. More information on the timing issue is available [here](https://www.comp.xyz/t/proposal-openzeppelin-security-partnership-2022-q2-adjustment/3100/5?u=cylon).**

Starting on Dec 21st, 2021, OpenZeppelin was [selected](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/76) to offer the Compound DAO security services including continuous audit, security advisory, and monitoring. 

OpenZeppelin has finished auditing the Compound Deployed Contracts and finalized the CToken Refactor audit ([details here](https://blog.openzeppelin.com/compound-comprehensive-protocol-audit/)). On the Security Advisory services, OpenZeppelin has been focusing on improving[ the security of the Proposal Process](https://www.comp.xyz/t/proposal-security-process-discussion/2773) and Asset Listings. Finally, on Security Monitoring, OpenZeppelin is aiming to release an initial solution by the end of March.

As outlined in the original proposal, at the start of every quarter OpenZeppelin will create a proposal to update the service fee payment in accordance with the formula outlined in the [proposal](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/76). As it is the beginning of a new quarter, OpenZeppelin is updating its existing streaming grant.

More detail in this [forum post](https://www.comp.xyz/t/proposal-openzeppelin-quarterly-adjustment/3100)

OpenZeppelin Security Partnership - 2022 Q2 Adjustment V4

## Summary
This proposal is a patch developed by Equilibria which updates the cToken implementation contract for mid TVL assets. The new implementation has been deployed to [0x3363BAe2Fc44dA742Df13CD3ee94b6bB868ea376](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3363bae2fc44da742df13cd3ee94b6bb868ea376).

## Changelog
These changes implement the following:

* Upgrade the Solidity version of the cToken and related contracts to 0.8.10 - all contracts in the repo were changed to 0.8.10 but only the cTokens will be upgraded as part of upcoming governance proposals. This is due to the complexity of having multiple Solidity versions in the same repo.
* Remove the usage of SafeMath and CarefulMath in favor of Solidity 0.8’s checked math - Solidity will now automatically revert when math errors occur (overflows, division by zero, etc)
* Remove the custom errorCode return values in favor of reverts and custom errors - this allows for a more structured way to deal with errors rather than enum or string comparisons.

The last batch of cTokens will be upgraded in a future proposal if this one passes and causes no issues.

The previous upgrade can be seen here: [Proposal 96](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/96)

## Development
The code changes can be viewed here: [Pull Request #152](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-protocol/pull/152).

Audits of these changes were completed by ChainSecurity and OpenZeppelin and all issues were either fixed or out of scope for this change. For further discussion, please view the [Community Forum thread](https://www.comp.xyz/t/rfp12-implementation-ctoken-cleanup/2694).

Update Mid-TVL cToken Implementations

The initial objective of the COMP rewards program was to distribute the token to our users. While this was an effective way to kickstart Compound and reward early users, the practice of COMP farming for profit has become very problematic.

Since most COMP being distributed by the current rewards program is instantly sold off, existing users and token holders are at a great disservice. Their share of the protocol is being diluted for nothing other than farming COMP for profit. This COMP farming behavior is not the kind of activity that will bring value to the protocol, or for the existing users and token holders. Incentives need to be used to grow the protocol to the benefit of the protocol itself and its users and token holders.

Going forward, I believe it’s best to end the current COMP rewards program and to start a new one with the sole purpose of kickstarting new markets: kickstart rewards.

This proposal is the second step towards launching the new rewards program - **existing rewards are being slashed to 0**.

For more information and discussion, please visit the [discussion thread on the forums](https://www.comp.xyz/t/comp-reward-adjustments-v2/3074/).

COMP Rewards Adjustments - Kickstart Rewards: Step Two

## Background

**There were [timing issues](https://www.comp.xyz/t/proposal-openzeppelin-security-partnership-2022-q2-adjustment/3100/3?u=cylon) with the Sablier stream creation in the past two canceled proposals [94](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/94) and [95](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/95) that has been corrected in this proposal. More information on the timing issue and how we've corrected for it is available [here](https://www.comp.xyz/t/proposal-openzeppelin-security-partnership-2022-q2-adjustment/3100/5?u=cylon).**

Starting on Dec 21st, 2021, OpenZeppelin was [selected](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/76) to offer the Compound DAO security services including continuous audit, security advisory, and monitoring. 

OpenZeppelin has finished auditing the Compound Deployed Contracts and finalized the CToken Refactor audit ([details here](https://blog.openzeppelin.com/compound-comprehensive-protocol-audit/)). On the Security Advisory services, OpenZeppelin has been focusing on improving[ the security of the Proposal Process](https://www.comp.xyz/t/proposal-security-process-discussion/2773) and Asset Listings. Finally, on Security Monitoring, OpenZeppelin is aiming to release an initial solution by the end of March.

## Replacing Existing Contributor Grant with Sablier Stream

As outlined in the original proposal, at the start of every quarter OpenZeppelin will create a proposal to update the service fee payment in accordance with the formula outlined in the [proposal](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/76).

As it is the beginning of a new quarter, OpenZeppelin is updating its streaming grant and replacing its existing COMP stream with a Sablier stream. This governance proposal sets the OpenZeppelin ContributorCompSpeed to zero and sets up a Sablier stream to OpenZeppelin instead.

More detail in this [forum post](https://www.comp.xyz/t/proposal-openzeppelin-quarterly-adjustment/3100)

OpenZeppelin Security Partnership - 2022 Q2 Adjustment V3

## Simple Summary

A proposal to adjust two (2) parameters for two (2) Compound assets.

## Background
This proposal is a batch update of risk parameters to align with the [Moderate risk level](https://www.comp.xyz/t/community-risk-level-consensus-check/2437) chosen by the Compound community. These parameter updates are the ninth of Gauntlet's regular parameter recommendations as part of [Dynamic Risk Parameters](https://www.comp.xyz/t/dynamic-risk-parameters/2223/16).


[Full proposal and forum discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/risk-parameter-updates-2022-03-29/3111)


## Motivation and Specification

This set of parameter updates seeks to maintain the overall risk tolerance of the protocol while making risk trade-offs between specific assets.

Our parameter recommendations are driven by an optimization function that balances 3 core metrics: insolvencies, liquidations, and borrow usage. Our parameter recommendations seek to optimize for this objective function. For more details, please see [Gauntlet's Parameter Recommendation Methodology](https://medium.com/gauntlet-networks/gauntlets-parameter-recommendation-methodology-8591478a0c1c) and [Gauntlet's Model Methodology](https://medium.com/gauntlet-networks/gauntlets-model-methodology-ea150ff0bafd).


![](https://i.imgur.com/d90n5g1.png)


## Dashboard


Gauntlet has launched the [Compound Risk Dashboard](https://gov.gauntlet.network/compound). The community should use the Dashboard to better understand the updated parameter suggestions and general market risk in Compound.


Value at Risk represents the 95th percentile **insolvency value** that occurs from simulations we run over a range of volatilities to approximate a tail event. 

Liquidations at Risk represents the 95th percentile **liquidation volume** that occurs from simulations we run over a range of volatilities to approximate a tail event.

Even though these changes result in less than 1 bp of increased Borrow Usage given the current TVLs, they will improve long-term capital efficiency as the protocol grows and more users supply YFI and SUSHI.

![](https://i.imgur.com/S5OIfAF.png)

Risk Parameter Updates for YFI and SUSHI

### Summary

This proposal reduces the MKR market's borrow limit from the current value of 25,000 MKR to 5,000 MKR.

### Reasoning

Lowering the borrow limit makes it more difficult for malicious parties to interfere with MakerDAO governance. This should reduce the likelihood of disruption to Compound's DAI and MKR markets, and also minimize risk to the wider defi ecosystem. 

MKR is not frequently borrowed, and based on historical demand across Aave and Compound this 5,000 token limit is unlikely to limit typical usage.

See the full discussion [here](https://www.comp.xyz/t/reducing-mkr-borrow-cap/2959).

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